Media Discourse on Migration and Modern Roman Culture: a Preliminary Study

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INTRODUCTION

Last summer, while living in Siena, Italy, I would spend each evening sharing an espresso with my host family while watching the Telegiornale. In July, there were scattered reports speaking of migration issues in both Sicily and Rome, often speaking of migrants with derogatory, scathing diction and painful characterizations. My host grandparents, who I later discovered were quite conservative politically, echoed these negative sentiments, explaining that migrants who were stealing jobs and incomes from the young people of their homeland, caused, at least in part, the economic crisis of the country. They simultaneously chastised other European countries and their own for allowing “thieves” to corrupt the moral compass of the continent by bringing diseases, danger, and lawlessness. I was struck by the way that thirty seconds of media negative attention on migration issues incited such strong feelings from my host parents, who, for the most part did not actively engage with migrants in their small neighborhood. Upon my return to Italy, in the wake of a growing migration (non)crisis, my anthropological tendency drew me to better understand just how big of a factor the media is on shaping public opinion in Italy regarding migration and refugees.

My research focused on the intersection of mass media and immigration in Rome, with particular attention to the potential influence of media on public opinion. When I began my research, my intention was twofold: (1) to uncover Romans’ perceptions of immigrants in their neighborhoods; (2) to understand the role that the media may have in shaping these opinions. The project was conducted to answer the question: do journalists’ descriptions of refugees in
Rome in media outlets influence Romans’ attitudes toward the presence of the larger migrant community in the city, and if so, how? Based on my background literature, it became readily evident that the media has historically had a strong influence on public opinion in Italy. This was especially relevant during Mussolini’s reign, but has not subsided like other social and political practices during his time in power. In current times, the media places a strong emphasis on refugee and migrant issues with both negative and positive attitudes in Italian journalism. Throughout my fieldwork, I sought to understand the presence and magnitude of the media’s influence on Romans’ attitudes toward the presence of migrants in their city.

**BACKGROUND**

In order to ground this research in current scholarly dialogue, I focused my background literature on three areas that help to frame my question in the larger conversation of media and influence, as well as the local with regard to migrants and racism in Italy. The three categories are: (1) media influence on public opinion; (2) racism in Italy; and (3) migration policies and experiences in Italy. These three categories were crucial in assisting me to craft and develop my methodology, because they provided a basis upon which I could support my evaluations and interviews. This combination of categories leads to an interesting set of questions regarding the overall influence of the media on a range of social issues in Italy, and, more specifically, the role that the media plays in shaping the cycle of migration in Italy. Through this background literature, I was able to shape my research methodology and interview questions to determine not only if the Italian media has an influence on public opinion, but also, if it does, how it accomplishes this influence.
The first important focal point in understanding the foundations of my research question is the body of literature that focuses on the influence of the media on public opinion, which became a legitimate and substantial area of research starting in the 1950’s. Warren Breed, one of the first prominent researchers on the power of the media, based his analysis on the concept of discourse. This age-old concept has been debated and discussed since the time of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, and other famous and influential Greek philosophers. According to researchers at the University of Milano-Bicocca, “Discourse and language are not powerful per se. They are powerful when a powerful social group controls and uses them as instruments to maintain and legitimise (sic) its supremacy over others” (Montali, 2013; 226). Breed starts his article by stating, “Top leaders in formal organizations are makers of policy, but they must also secure and maintain conformity to that policy at lower levels. The situation of the newspaper publisher is a case in point” (Breed, 1955; 326). These suggestive opening lines have been echoed throughout the last 70 years by scholars across disciplines who have sought to understand the psychological, cultural, and social influences that media outlets have on public opinion, and how these influences might be related to the maintenance of conformity and political power. Breed claimed that every newspaper had some sort of policy that aligned with a certain social or political agenda. Some leaned toward conservative while others were more liberal, but regardless their reporting was tailored in such a way that supported the biased opinions of the political leaning to which they were inclined (327).

Fay Cook and her colleagues build upon Breed’s foundational notion of discourse and public opinion in their discussion of media’s “agenda setting” power, specifically his idea that discourse can be used as a tool to promote political conformity (Breed, 1955; 331). They refer to
agenda setting as “the media’s capacity to shape the general public’s policy priorities by leading the public to view certain issues as more important” (Cook, 1983; 16). The researchers continue to deepen the definition of agenda setting, indicating that the media not only plays a role in shaping the public’s opinion on a range of social issues – such as refugees and migration, – but also the power to increase the priority status of a particular social issue through the way they represent it. (17). This claim is particularly relevant to my research question in that I seek to understand the power that Italian media outlets have in increasing the priority of immigration as a pertinent social issue within the city of Rome.

To this end, scholarship on media and public opinion has trended from the general to more specific case studies, many of which cite Italy as a reference point. Mario Calabresi develops Breed and Cook’s foundations in the Italian context, explaining that Italian media outlets can often be described as having “too many ties to power, too many topics of discussion that leave people alienated, too much attention to the agendas of tiny groups and indifference to the common discourse” (Calabresi, 2015). Randazzo takes an even more radical stance with regard to the Italian Telegiornali, stating that “l’opinione pubblica è fondamentale per la stabilità di un sistema (the public opinion is fundamental for the stability of a system)” and, furthermore, the maintenance of this system has everything to do with preserving existing unequal socioeconomic politics where “l'opinione pubblica sia piegata a ciò che è funzionale al sistema e non apprenda alcune verità (the public opinion is bent to that which is functional for this system and does not learn any real truth)” (Randazzo, 2007). This sort of claim is an extension of Breed’s idea that all media outlets have some sort of biased nature on the political spectrum. Essentially, it is not just that all media is inherently bias, as Breed claims, but that this
bias serves to further a particular social status quo regardless of the left or right-orientation of a particular media outlet’s political opinions. By generalizing Breed’s claim, one can arrive at Randazzo’s conclusion that “il sistema politico-economico attuale è sempre più intoccabile, e coloro che lo criticano appaiono sempre meno in televisione” (2007).

Beyond the issue of ties to power within Italian journalism, Spalletta and Ugolini explore the issue of credibility through their research. They explain that a system is perceived as credible when the audience has deemed it worthy of their trust through evaluating several factors including likeability, legal authority, and other normative reasons (Spaletta, 2011; 179). By this logic, “credibility is no longer that personal characteristic [ethos] of which Aristotle spoke in *Rhetoric*, but a relationship, and as such it takes form, evolves, ceases, moves elsewhere” (179). In applying this definition to Italian journalism, it seems that it should perceived as credible by the public through its apparent transparency and political ties. However, this largely contradicts Italian public opinion that “trusts neither its journalists nor the overall information system, and that it hopes for a different type of journalism: […] where the] only ‘principal’ is the reader” (182). This sentiment of journalistic-doubt is echoed by Calabresi, who claims that the reader has historically been aware that he cannot fully trust the information that the media shares, and yet, “instead of understanding [the political influence of the media] and taking countermeasures, for years a vicious cycle continued to be fueled by a very self-referential media” (Calabresi, 2015).

With the understanding that Italians are to some degree aware of the dishonesty of their media outlets, it becomes necessary to understand why some might allow these exaggerated claims, especially with regard to migrants and migration issues, to continue to exist. Based on my understanding of Italian culture, it became apparent that one relevant factor that influences
this passive acceptance of media bias may be widespread racism. According to Angela Zanotti, “Europeans tend to deploy the term ‘racism’ to cover a range of attitudes and behaviors toward social groups stereotypically identified as ‘different,’ and ‘inferior’” (Zanotti, 1993; 173).

Specific sentiments of racism, she continues, involve “anti-Semitism, anti-‘black’ attitudes aimed at extra-European immigrants, and ethnic prejudice arising from ethnic separatism and the search for ethnic identity” (173). However, in Italy sentiments of anti-black racism are less based on skin color and more based on “unemployment fears, broken-down services, and narrowing economic prospects” (174), due to ideas of “black minorities being poor laborers from outside the European Community” (173). The spectrum of racism developed in Italy in the wake of the first major influx of immigrants in the 1980’s. After this, both racial and ethnic divides served as a means by which regional discrimination in Italy could be placed on the back burner, as all Italians unified against the different, more distinct “other.” This spectrum ranges from, “tolerance, on one side [the left], prejudice somewhere in between and violent discrimination, including violent racism, at the opposite end [the right]” (175).

This sense of racism exists within a cycle of migration in Europe, and especially Italy; it begins with an influx of a new immigrant population that results in heightened fears regarding the country’s ability to absorb these individuals into the current economic structure, which are manifest in varying degrees of racism. Ultimately, the government alters its immigration policy in order to curb this public panic, after which the “emphasis [passes] from a general discussion of global policy for immigration to a series of fluid realities in which there may be local racist episodes, but apparently no nationally coordinated racism” (176). This shift makes it appear as if “there is now a kind of ‘melting pot’ reality” in Italy where “The public, reassured by
immigration laws, has an option of seeing the immigrants as no longer a threat” to either Italian culture or the labor force (177).

With the large number of vaguely defined migrants to Italy who were seen as non-threats by the Italian people, and thus begrudgingly welcomed to stay, a need arose for a formal integration system. There are two main approaches that can be taken with regard to migrant integration into the social fabric. The first is a, “’top-down’ approach to integration in which governments and policy makers define integration goals and impose them on refugee populations”. The second follows the opposite trajectory, assessing the integration goals of refugees and their perceptions of relative achievement through the concordance, or lack thereof, with policy (Korač, 2003; 399). In Italy, specifically, there exists a poorly developed welfare system, “which has led to an underdeveloped integration programme (sic) and often ad hoc measures of assistance for individuals granted asylum” (399). This poorly-designed welfare system has made it difficult for asylum seekers and refugees to receive adequate assistance in the country. People are under the assumption that self-help systems will meet the necessary demands of these individuals while simultaneously instructing them on self-sufficiency, thereby causing no added burden to the Italian government economically (399).

The chaos of this severely flawed assumption has resulted in “governmental organizations and the NGO sector in Italy continually [dealing] with emergencies”– most specifically efforts to provide food, shelter, and language courses to asylum seekers and refugees (399). “Consequently, asylum seekers and refugees are often forced to sleep on the streets of the towns and cities where they wish to settle”, as is the case in the Rome Tiburtina neighborhood with recent African and Middle Eastern migrants to the area (400). Those programs that are
efficient and effective in providing migrants with skills to integrate into the nation’s workforce are sparsely placed and even more sparsely funded, which leads them to be “inadequate to meet the needs of a growing refugee population in the country” (400).

Claudia Aradau highlights the danger of Italy’s immigration policy, which pacifies the public, in the context of Italy’s historically racist heritage (Aradau, 2009). Her article points to the danger of using policy to further racially and ethnically motivated discrimination, such that particular groups are unfairly excluded from social participation (2). The Italian government performed such an act against the Roma\(^1\) in recent years, using common methods of tracking migrants to eliminate Romani from Italian cities, such as fingerprinting – used by the EU to track asylum seekers so that they do not apply in multiple countries (4). In this case, the Italian government sought to disguise their racism under the pretense of sanctioned legal practices, but did not fool the international community who condemned their actions and compared them to that of the Nazi party’s treatment of Jews.

In terms of migration on a global scale, “il flusso sud-nord è stato il principale motore delle tendenze di migrazione globale (the flow south-north has been the principal motor of tendencies in global migration)” (Forti, 2014). While each continent experiences patterns of emigration and immigration at different rates, Italy ranks eleventh on a list of European countries included in those receiving the highest percentage of migrants in recent years (Forti). In the past twenty years, “Europa ha attratto 28 milioni di immigrati (Europe has attracted 28 million migrants)”, which led to Italy reaching a new height with 12.6 percent of the population being immigrants, most residing in the Lombardy and Lazio regions (Forti). In fact, “solo 5 paesi, fra

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\(^1\) A nomadic ethnic group, thought to originate in the Middle East. Many currently reside in European countries and are infamous for pickpocketing according to European Tourism Councils
Furthermore, “In Italy the term ‘refugee’ […] flows between different and ambivalent meanings: a person without regular visa, an asylum seeker, an illegal migrant, in other terms a Non-persona” (Capussotti, 2003; 142).

This problem stems from the fact that, unlike many other European countries with established histories of oppression, Italy does not have a cultural framework of sensitivity upon which it is meant to base its judgment of others. For example, in the United States, the historical reality of slavery provokes Americans to be sensitive to racial slurs and derogatory language used toward African-Americans. This can be seen, in part, as an effort to prevent a return to social stratification based on race, rather than economics. In Italy, however, this same history is not readily present, and thus allows for a more open sort of racism that is not possible in other European countries. Arandau reflects this idea in saying that “the problem with the accusations of racism and fascism was that they did not make sense of the government’s measures against the Roma as part of the ordinary fabric of liberal politics” (3).

METHODOLOGY

To answer my research question, I conducted interviews in two Roman neighborhoods: Tiburtina and Monteverde. I chose these two areas because I wanted to control for the variable of migrant presence or absence. Tiburtina is traditionally known as a migrant-heavy neighborhood in Rome, which I felt could have skewed the data to be more strongly negative than the average Roman; the contrary is the case for Monteverde. Additionally, I wanted to analyze my data according to this migrant present-absent variable to determine if the presence of migrants, not just the media’s discussion of them, in an individual’s neighborhood had an
overall negative or positive influence on their opinions. I conducted my interviews in cafes and pizzerias during slow business hours. I felt that speaking with owners of shops and their patrons would be the best way to reach a pool of individuals with different political affiliations, religious beliefs, and family backgrounds.

My population sample included a total of 20 individuals. I selected 10 participants in each of the two neighborhoods. When I approached a potential informant, I asked for their age and gender. This information provided a comparative basis when performing cross-sectional analysis of findings.

During my interviews, I asked a series of ten short questions that did not require much time so that informants were more likely to participate. In the middle of the 10 questions, I inserted a clipping from an Italian newspaper. I selected one positive clipping and one negative clipping. I administered the positive survey to five individuals in each of the two neighborhoods, and the negative survey to the remaining five participants. The two surveys were exactly the same in content except for the news article to limit variability and skewed results.

The positive clipping was written for *La Repubblica* in 2015. It reads:

Respingere i migranti che arrivano dal mare, come avviene ai Rohingya, popolazione musulmana in fuga dal Myanmar nell'Oceano Indiano, è "guerra", "violenza", "uccidere". Non usa mezzi termini Papa Francesco per rinnovare l'invito all'accoglienza di chi fugge dal proprio Paese e contrastare la scelta di chi pensa di risolvere il problema respingendoli: "E' un atto di guerra", sottolinea Bergoglio, parlando a braccio con i ragazzi del Movimento Eucaristico Giovanile in occasione del centenario della sua fondazione.

"Se ti uccido è finito il conflitto. Ma non è il cammino", ha detto ai 1500 ragazzi che lo ascoltavano nell'aula Paolo VI. Per il Pontefice "quando identità diverse vivono insieme, sempre ci saranno i conflitti, ma - ha scandito - soltanto col rispetto dell'identità dell'altro si risolve il conflitto. Le tensioni si risolvono nel dialogo, i veri conflitti sociali e culturali si risolvono col dialogo ma prima con il rispetto dell'identità dell'altra persona."
The negative clipping was written for *Secolo d’Italia* in 2015. It reads:

Per De Corato il primo cittadino «dovrebbe procedere anche con la bonifica dei luoghi pubblici, della stazione, della metropolitana e di tutti quei luoghi dove i profughi si son fermati. Perché poi non si fa anche a Milano quello che è stato fatto a Roma Tiburtina? Lì ieri circa cento immigrati di varie nazionalità, che erano accampati vicino alla stazione, sono stati allontanati dalle forze dell’ordine che hanno sgomberato la piazza. Una ventina sono anche stati fermati e portati all’ufficio immigrazione per l’identificazione. Pisapia lo chieda anche in Stazione Centrale».

Casi di scabbia anche a Roma, fra gli immigrati ammassati alla stazione Tiburtina, un gioiello architettonico divenuto ora bivacco dei rifugiati. Una situazione drammatica di fronte alla quale la Croce Rossa allarga le braccia costretta a fare i conti con numeri incredibili e con un emergenza mai vista prima grazie alle politiche di accoglienza a tutti i costi messe in campo dal duo Renzi-Alfano.

I structured the interviews in four parts: introduction; pre-news clip questions; reading of the news clip; post-news clip questions. My first step was to briefly explain to the informant the purpose of my research, which I stated as follows: *Sto portando avanti una ricerca per l’Università John Cabot di Roma sull’immigrazione a Roma e sull’impatto che ha sui cittadini romani, e vorrei farti poche domande sulla tua esperienza personale e sulle tue opinioni sugli immigrati.* After explaining why I was conducting the research I ensured confidentiality by saying: “*Garantisco la sua riservatezza. Il suo nome e le sue informazioni personali non saranno collegati al tuo risposte in alcun modo nel mio tema finale.*” Then, after they agreed to participate, I asked the following pre-clip questions:

1. Per piacere, condividi brevemente la tua opinione riguardo gli immigrati che vivono a Roma. *Please briefly share your opinions regarding the immigrants that live in Rome.*
2. Hai qualche preoccupazione riguardo gli immigrati che vivono nella tua città? Quali sono? *Do you have any worries about immigrants that live in your city? What are they?*
3. Quanto spesso interagisci con i rifugiati nella vita di tutti i giorni? Dove vedi gli immigrati e i rifugiati nel tuo quartiere? *How often do you encounter refugees in your daily life? Where do you see immigrants in your neighborhood?*
After the participant had responded to those questions, they continued on to read a positive or negative news clipping (as seen above). They then concluded by answering the following post-clip questions:

1. Come ti senti riguardo ai rifugiati che vivono nel tuo quartiere?
   *How do you feel about refugees that live in your neighborhood?*
2. Hai esitazioni a far stanziare gli immigrati vicino casa tua? Perché?
   *Do you have hesitations with immigrants living near your house? Why?*
3. Pensi che ci siano preoccupazioni aggiuntive circa salute e sicurezza quando gli immigrati si trasferiscono nel tuo quartiere?
   *Do you think that concerns are worsened about health and security when immigrants move to your neighborhood?*
4. Qual è la tua fonte di informazione primaria sugli immigrati e sui rifugiati in Italia?
   *What is your primary source of information about immigrants and refugees in Italy?*
5. Pensi che avere immigrati in Italia sia buono? Perché?
   *Do you think that having immigrants in Italy is good? Why?*

The questions pre and post-clip were written in such a way that they are consistent in tone and general objective, so that the results were not skewed. The diction used in the pre and cost-clip questions was intentionally different, just enough so that it was not readily noticeable to the participant, so that they would attempt to provide answers for which they thought I was looking. I asked the four questions, respectively, in order to gather information about where informants received information about migrants, and the potential channels through which attitudes toward “outsiders” might be shaped, changed, and perpetuated.

**ANALYSIS**
Analysis of my results occurred on macro and micro levels through a mixed methods approach. First, I looked at overall attitudes regarding migrant presence, and the shift that potentially occurred before and after the clip was read. I tracked these changes by coding the informants’ responses by color, red being most strongly negative and purple being most strongly positive. This coding ranges as follows: severely negative in red, somewhat negative in yellow, neutral in green, somewhat positive in blue, and severely positive in purple (Table 1). When choosing color assignments for each of question, I looked for charged diction, negative or positive, that was indicative of the feeling of the participant. For example, one participant said that she “feared the presence of migrants for her child’s safety when walking home from school,” which led me to code this response in red, because she expressed a strongly negative attitude toward migrants living near her home. I color-coded all of these responses on Excel so that I could visually track the variations in responses: (1) within an individual survey; (2) between informants from the same neighborhood; (3) across neighborhoods. The aggregate of this analysis is illustrated below:
The Tiburtina ("T") responses sit on the left side of the image, and the Monteverde ("MV") responses are on the right. The "N/A" value reflects the question in which I was seeking general information regarding channels of information about migrants, which could not be coded.

After creating this table, I created a scale for pre and post-clip questions and compared their frequency to the age of each of the respondents (Table 2.1).
In order to analyze the correlation between gender and opinion, I assigned each respondent with an “N” for negative, “U” for neutral, or “P” for positive. Red and yellow averages were given an “N”, green was assigned with a “U”, and “P” was given to blue and purple averages. Below is the small table created that reflects the number and proportion of men and women, distinctly, that have negative, neutral, and positive opinions about migrants (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

The next phase of the analysis looked at each neighborhood with the same criteria for labeling “N,” “U,” and “P” to examine if there was a significant difference in the quantity of negative and positive responses in each of the two neighborhoods (Table 4). The table below is representative of this information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEIGHBORHOOD</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIBURTINA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTEVERDE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

I also analyzed the different responses to “PRE-Q4” and “POST-Q4” to determine the most prevalent and common sources my informants used in order to gain information about migration
and migrants. Based on this analysis, I was able to legitimize the conclusions that follow because 

80% of my informants cited some form of news, written or oral, as their primary source of 
information. The table below depicts this information.

Table 5

My final point of analysis was a comparison of “POST-Q3” and the “AVERAGE” post-clip 
question attitude, in order to determine if reading about health concerns in a news article 
produced markedly negative attitudes about post-clip question three, which asked about health 
and safety related concerns. The table below shows the findings of this comparison.

Table 6

FINDINGS

The analysis of my fieldwork led to five main conclusions: (1) the attitudes toward 
migrants, on average, are more negative in Tiburtina than in Monteverde; (2) specific health and 
safety concerns in the city are potentially heightened by the media; (3) most informants received 
their information on current migration issues from the news or through talking with families and 
friends; (4) people between the ages of 18 and 39 tended to have more positive feelings than 
those aged 40 and above; and (5) there were no particularly relevant trends between gender and 
attitude.
My first objective of analysis was the general attitudes toward migrants in each of the two neighborhoods, which can be seen through the color-coded responses for each respondent (Table 1). The attitudes appeared much more strongly negative in Tiburtina – demonstrated by a larger presence of red and yellow than green, blue, and purple – compared to Monteverde. This is further suggested by Table 4, where the data skewed negative for six out of 10 participants in the Tiburtina neighborhood, compared to a neutral skew in Monteverde, with only 30% of participants responding negatively, on average. While my population sample may not be large enough to make definitive conclusions, it is possible that proximity is an important factor in an individual’s attitudes toward migrants. This finding relates to Zanotti’s discussion of local episodes of racism that are often due to the influx of new migrants to a particular neighborhood or city. Residents of Tiburtina may have a more strongly negative view of migrants than residents of Monteverde based on frequency of interaction with racial and ethnic minorities. Thus, there is not a consistent degree in the sentiment of anti-migrant across the city – as Zanotti points out – but instead local episodes of discrimination that are concentrated in the “melting pot” areas she describes.

The second compelling result of my study was that, in the case of the negative article, there was on average a marked change in response to post-clip question number 3, regarding safety and health. To reach this conclusion, I compared the color of each participant’s response to “POST-Q3” (Table 1) with the color of his or her “AVERAGE” post-clip attitude. In 60% of cases, the response to “POST-Q3” was at least one degree more negative than his or her “AVERAGE” post-clip attitude. For those 40% of participants whose attitudes did not become more strongly negative for “POST-Q3”, their responses were consistent with their average
post-clip attitudes. This is evident through side-by-side comparison (Table 6). This finding is reflective of Randazzo’s opinion and those of others who point to the manipulative power of the media in influencing the public’s opinion regarding certain social or political issues that the media finds important.

The third conclusion I was able to make through data analysis was that most individuals get their information on current migration issues through listening to the Telegiornali, reading news articles, or talking with friends and family. “PRE-Q4” and “POST-Q4” were both designed to provide this information, and thus were not coded in Table 1. Out of 20 participants, 11 explained that they received their information primarily from televised news broadcasts, 5 cited written news articles as their main source, and the remaining 4 pointed to conversations with others as their information point (Table 5). This fits with the research of Calabresi, who points to Italians’ dependence on the media for information despite their awareness of its tendency to be extremely biased and politically serving.

Through microanalysis, I was able to draw more in-depth conclusions about migration attitudes. According to Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, individuals below the age of 40, on average, reacted more positively to questions about migrants than those above that age threshold. Individuals above the age of 60 were especially negative in their attitudes and responses. The conclusion could be made that there is a generational disparity with regard to attitudes about the current social issues in Italy. However, the size of my population prevents this from being fully conclusive, as I had a much larger portion of 20-39 year old informants (60%) than those above 40 (40%). While I could not find particular schools of scholarship to substantiate this finding,
contemporary analysis of Italian film and literature often points to this generational gap in social opinion in favor of traditionalism and homogeneity.  

The final conclusion I was able to make regarding this data was that the correlation between gender and attitude was not strong. Based on Table 3, it is visible that, males and females generally had a similar distribution of negative, neutral, and positive attitudes regardless of both neighborhood and charge (positive or negative) of the article that was read.

CONCLUSION

This research project set out to better understand the extent to which the media directly influences Romans’ opinions regarding migrants in their city. Through fieldwork and analysis, it has become evident that the media has a small, yet not negligible, influence on public opinion with regard to migration. This conclusion was reached by noting that, overall, individuals “AVERAGE” attitudes did not change much from pre-clip to post-clip questions. They did, however, vary significantly with regard to the third post-clip question that focused on health concerns after the informants had read the health-related article. Thus, there seems to be a degree of control and manipulation that the media possesses over such issues. In particular, by heightening concerns regarding specific social problems through their deeply embedded roots in Italians’ everyday lives, as Calabresi suggests. This research could be further expanded upon in two ways: (1) including more individuals in the population sample, such that the data is more representative of the entire city and is less likely to be skewed or biased; (2) investigating other leading factors – such as politics, family beliefs, religion, occupation, economy – that influence a

2 see Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow by Vittorio de Sica as an example of this generational conflict
Roman’s attitudes toward migrants to better understand how these attitudes are deeply rooted in the mindsets and practices of their daily lives. As a whole, this research has created the grounding upon which a great deal of expansion can be made in order to better understand reasons for the sometimes hostile climate between Romans and migrants in the city. With this information, politicians and NGOs can formulate programs and policies that work to alleviate tensions in an effort to promote further social and cultural integration. In this way, migrants may not forever be considered “outsiders” but become recognized as legitimate Italians just like those whose ancestors all originate from this country.
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